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The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating role of the characteristics of the chief executive officer (CEO) on the association between CEO power and corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance.

This paper conducts multiple regression analyses to empirically test the proposed hypotheses based on a sample of US-based publicly held companies. The sample period extends from 2000 to 2018. Firm-level CSR ratings are obtained from the Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD) database (currently known as MSCI ESG STATS). Financial data and CEO data are retrieved from Compustat and ExecuComp databases, respectively. Additional test and robustness analysis are performed.

This paper shows that firms with more powerful CEOs are less likely to engage in CSR activities. The negative association between CEO power and CSR is found to be exacerbated by CEOs who are younger, more competent and overconfident; however, this negative association is mitigated by CEOs who are female. This paper also finds that gender plays a more important role among CEO characteristics. Collectively, the findings highlight the potential opportunities to better understand the role of various CEO characteristics that jointly affect CSR.

First, this is the first study providing a comprehensive empirical analysis of how various CEO characteristics jointly affect CSR. Prior studies that focus on standalone CEO characteristics offer an incomplete picture of the relation between a single CEO characteristic and a firm's CSR performance. The current study thus extends the research field by examining the association between seemingly unrelated CEO characteristics and CSR performance. The results also highlight that gender is the critical factor moderating the relationship between CEO power and CSR performance when it is compared with CEO age, ability and overconfidence. Second, the authors add to the literature on employee selection by showing that female CEOs mitigate the negative effect of managerial power on CSR performance. Although the currently available empirical research in management control systems focuses on ex-post analyses of moral hazard mitigation for incumbent employees, both the economics and management literature acknowledge ex ante evidence suggesting that employee selection is even more important. Our findings may provide insight into the selection of CEOs.

This paper aims to investigate the performance effects of an incentive plan that links buyers' compensation to financial measures, namely sales and gross margin, in the retail industry. It seeks to examine the issue using field data obtained from the 3C (computers, communications, and consumer electronics) company, the largest electronics chain store business in Taiwan.

In addition to t‐tests, the authors use a multiple regression model to examine the impact of the buyer incentive plan on purchasing performance.

It was found that the gross margin return on inventory investment (GMROI), the most critical purchasing performance measure in retailing, deteriorated after implementing the incentive plan. Further analysis showed that although sales and gross margins increased as a result of the plan, the benefits were completely offset by a significant decrease in inventory turnover.

This study has two limitations. First, the case study involved a specific retail chain. Thus, the extent that the results can be generalized to other organizations or other industries has yet to be explored. Second, to obtain a more comprehensive dataset and more observations, procurement team data was used instead of individual buyer data to measure the purchasing performance.

Managers should be aware of possible negative impacts when they design incentive plans, e.g. dysfunctional behavior among employees.

An incentive plan should incorporate all critical components related to buyer performance if there is to be improvement in terms of the key performance measures. The paper contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence about the appropriateness of the performance measures used in buyer incentive plans designed for the retail industry.